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Modem Models of Organ Donation:
Challenging Increases of Federal
Power to Save Lives
by JONATHAN G. AUGUST*
Introduction
Signed into law in 2010 by President Barack Obama, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA") represented the largest
amendment to the United States healthcare system since the
introduction of Medicare in 1965.' The ACA mandates that all
Americans, excluding those with religious and financial exceptions,
purchase a form of health insurance-either public or private-if they
are not already subscribed to a plan by 2014.2 Although Congress
claimed it enacted the ACA under its power stemming from the
Commerce Clause, by arguing that the health insurance industry is a
unique interstate market in need of federal interference to prevent
insolvency, the Supreme Court upheld the law on taxation grounds.
While both the merits and constitutionality of the ACA have been
debated by scholars and the public alike, the fact that this expansive
bill was declared constitutional raises a broader legal question: If
Congress can enact this kind of law, how far can it go in extending the
power of the federal government into the realm of healthcare?
Aside from the crisis surrounding health insurance, another
significant issue in modern healthcare has been the search for
* Juris Doctor Candidate 2013, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A. 2009, Columbia University. The author first must thank Professor Radhika Rao for
her time, assistance, and encouragement throughout the past year in helping this academic
note come to fruition. Her guidance was truly invaluable. The author also would be
remiss if he did not thank Dr. Sharon Mass, Dr. Stuart Finder, and his parents for helping
launch the idea that forms the basis of this article.
1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub, L. 111-148 (2010).
2. Id.
3. Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 544 (6th Cir. 2011); see also
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 2012 WL 2427810.
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solutions regarding the dangerously low rate of organ donations.
Currently, although just over forty percent of United States residents
are registered organ donors, in the first ten months of 2011 only
11,716 donors were actually involved in procedures. Section I of this
note will briefly review the current majority model of organ donation
in the United States and the reasons why donor rates remain low as a
result. Section II then discusses the prevailing views on the
constitutionality of changing United States organ donation law to a
system of presumed consent. Section III assesses the underpinnings,
statistics, and potential First Amendment challenge to altering organ
donation law to the model of mandated choice, as has been in place in
Illinois since 2006. Section IV analyzes the history, likely results, and
potential constitutional challenge related to a preferred donation
system in which Americans who register to be live donors would
receive preference as recipients, similar to the model passed in Israel
in 2008.' Section V discusses alternate forms of incentivizing
donations including financial compensation, creating a market for
organs, and private exchange networks. Lastly, Section VI discusses
which model is likely to not only provide the highest increase in
donor rates, but also why each model can survive a constitutionally-
based challenge if crafted wisely.
I. The Current Majority Model: Informed Consent
A. History
In 1968, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") passed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
("UAGA").6 UAGA is a model law, yet all fifty states and the
District of Columbia have adopted some variation of the act.' Key
provisions in UAGA include who is eligible to donate organs,8 the
4. National Donor Designation Report Card, Donate Life America (April 2011),
http://donatelife.net/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/DLAReportBKLT307332.pdf; Transplant
Trends, United Network for Organ Sharing, http://www.unos.org (last visited Jan. 22,
2012).
5. Organ Implementation Law, 5768-2008, SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.).
6. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1, 8A U.L.A. 70 (1968).
7. Alicia Markmann, Organ Donation: Increasing Donations While Honoring Our
Longstanding Values, 24 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 499, 505 (2005). As of Jan. 27,
2012, 44 states, the District of Columbia, and the United States Virgin Islands have
adopted the revised version of the UAGA. The remaining six states currently use the
1968 version of the Act.
8. Revised Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §§ 4, 9, 8A U.L.A. 70 (2006).
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rights and duties of donees, physicians, and donors,' and who may
receive anatomical gifts.'o UAGA was further amended in 1987 to
forbid persons from "knowingly, for valuable consideration,
purchas[ing] or sell[ing] a part for transplantation or therapy, if
removal of the part is intended to occur after the death of the
decedent.""
One of the primary goals of UAGA was to make organ donation
a system based on altruism and voluntarism.12 As a result, for any
person in the United States to make an anatomical gift, the donor
must give their consent, or "opt in."" Consent may be given in a
variety of forms, the most common of which are either a preference
indicated on the decedent's driver's license or permission from a
decedent's family members in a hospital soon after the moment of
death.' Other means of acquiring consent from donors include
approval in a decedent's will," verbal communication by a terminally
ill patient made in the presence of two adults (at least one of whom is
disinterested)," or through a written and signed statement." If an
individual does not give consent for a living donation or indicate a
preference to donate their organs after death, it is illegal to harvest
any of their organs.
To further effectuate the intent of UAGA, Congress created the
Health Care Financing Administration ("HFCA"), now known as the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS"), in 1977.
Despite UAGA's ratification across the country, Congress recognized
the unwillingness of hospitals to attempt to secure organ donations,
and in response it mandated eligibility requirements for Medicare
reimbursement. One such requirement is that hospitals must ask all
9. Id. at §§ 5,6.
10. Id. at § 11.
11. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 10, 8A U.L.A. 70 (1987).
12. Howard M. Nathan et al., Organ donation in the United States, AM. J. TRANS.
2003; 3 (Supp. 4): 29, 31 (2003).
13. Sean R. Fitzgibbons, Cadaveric Organ Donation and Consent: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States, Japan, Singapore, and China, 6 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 73
(1999).
14. Nathan, supra note 12 at 31.
15. Revised Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 5(a)(2), 8A U.L.A. 70 (2006).
16. Id. at § 5(a)(3).
17. Id. at § 5(b).
18. Id. at § 5.
19. Historical Highlights, Department of Health and Human Services,
http://www.hhs.gov/about/hhshist.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
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donor-eligible patients and their families if they would like to
donate.20 These "required request" laws were also developed under
the belief that asking patients, and their families, for organ donations
would make them more willing to make a gift."
B. Organ donation rates under informed consent
Since the promulgation of UAGA and ratification of required
request laws, organ donation rates in the United States have
remained in the middle when compared to the rest of the world. As
of November 2012, there were 116,482 active waitlist candidates for
organ donations in the United States, yet the total number of
transplant procedures done in the first ten months of 2011 was only
23,749.22 While just over forty percent of all Americans are registered
organ donors," and organ donation rates in the United States have
very recently seen a slight upward trend, many states have failed to
meet the goals set for them by leading organ donation groups.24
Despite this shortfall, the United States has higher organ donation
rates than foreign countries that also employ informed consent-
including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Australia, which all
have donor rates of fifteen per million population ("pmp") or lower.25
What is particularly startling about the case of the United States
is that surveys indicate the cadaveric organ donation rate should be
significantly higher. Numerous polls have shown that nearly all
Americans are aware of organ transplantation and a vast majority of
individuals say they would donate their organs if asked.26 In reality,
less than half of families ever consent to donating their own or a
20. Nathan, supra note 12, at 31; 42 C.F.R. § 482.45 (1998).
21. Nathan, supra note 12, at 32.
22. Data, OPTN, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2012).
23. Supra Introduction.
24. Id. The Donor Designation Collaborative (DDC), launched in 2006, is a joint
effort with the goals of increasing organ donation rates and developing more efficient
donor registries. As of November 2010, only 36 states and the District of Columbia have
met the requirements for effective donor registries, while only 24 states have donor rates
above fifty percent for residents 18 years and older.
25. Frank Van Gelder, et al., 2009 International Donation And Transplantation
Activity. IRODaT Preliminary Data, International Registry of Organ Donation and
Transplant (IRODaT) (2010), http://www.europeantransplantcoordinators.org/uploads/
pdfs/Irodat/01 %20Irodat%202009.pdf.
26. Nathan, supra note 12, at 32. The Gallup poll from 1993 used in the article
indicates that ninety-nine percent of Americans are aware of transplantation. Three polls
from 1991, 1993, and 2001 show that about seventy-five percent of those surveyed would
agree to donate their organs.
[Vol. 40:2396 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUJARTERLY
Winter 2013) MODERN MODELS OF ORGAN DONATION
loved one's organs.27 This disparity between those who say they want
to donate and the actual registration rate stems from numerous flaws
with the informed consent system.2 ' These flaws include doctors
following the wishes of the decedent's family instead of the wishes of
the decedent, the failure of emergency personnel to locate written
directives at accident sites, and the inefficiency of organ procurement
services in obtaining referrals from donors.29 One of the leading
factors contributing to a lower-than-expected organ donation rate
under the informed consent model is the reluctance of potential
donors to contemplate and plan for their inevitable deaths.0 Despite
the United States maintaining one of the highest rates of organ
donation for informed consent countries at over twenty-one pmp,
polling suggests the disparity between registered donors and actual
transplants should be far less than it is."
The growing need for organ donations and apparent failure of
the informed consent system to match the increased demand
generates the question: What other models exist, would they increase
organ donation rates, and can they be successfully implemented in the
United States?
II. The Common Alternative: Presumed Consent
A. Background
The most frequently used alternative model of organ donation to
informed consent is the presumed consent system. Broadly
construed, the presumed consent, or "opt out," system statutorily
mandates that the organs of a decedent are available for donation
because the decedent has tacitly given his or her consent unless
otherwise indicated.2 Practically, there are two forms of presumed
consent: strong and weak." Strong presumed consent systems prohibit
a decedent's family from interfering with the donation process,
27. Id. When families were actually asked to provide consent to donate a deceased's
organs, only forty-eight percent agreed to donate.
28. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, Refs. & Annos., 8A U.L.A. 70 (1987).
29. Id.
30. Andrew C. MacDonald, Organ Donation: The Time has Come to Refocus the
Ethical Spotlight, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y. REV. 177, 180 (1997).
31. Van Gelder, supra note 25.
32. Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Structure of Body Parts, 2006 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 317, 330-31.
33. Lori Hartwell, Global Organ Donation Policies Around the World,
Contemporary Dialysis & Nephrology (Dec. 1999)
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whereas weak presumed consent systems require permission from the
decedent's family before any organs can be harvested.34 The weak
model, used in Spain and Belgium, is far more common, and on its
face appears similar to the informed consent model used throughout
the majority of the United States.35
A recent study from Johns Hopkins University concluded that in
most countries with presumed consent, donation was discussed with
the decedent's family at the time of death despite doctors having the
legal right to harvest the organs." Furthermore, in the thirteen
European nations studied that have presumed consent laws, six
legally require doctors to speak with the relatives of the deceased."
One of the crucial considerations of weak presumed consent is the
respect for the decedent's relatives who are grieving and the notion
that strong presumed consent laws could impose even further
psychological damage upon those family members."
B. Organ donation rates under presumed consent
On the whole, countries that employ a presumed consent model
for organ donation have higher donation rates than countries using
alternate methods. Spain, which as previously mentioned operates a
weak presumed consent system, currently leads the world in number
of deceased organ donations at over thirty-four organs donated pmp."
Other European nations, including France, Belgium, Austria, Italy,
and Latvia, also use a presumed consent donation model and have
donor rates above twenty pmp.
Whether organ donation rates would rise as a result of changing
United States donation law to a presumed consent model is still a
matter of significant debate. The Johns Hopkins study from January
2012 indicates that while presumed consent may slightly increase
34. Id.
35. Brian Boyarsky et al., Potential Limitations of Presumed Consent Legislation, 93
Transplantation 136 (2012); Amber Rithalia et al., A Systemic Review of Presumed
Consent Systems for Deceased Organ Donation, 13 HEALTH TECH. ASSESSMENT 1 (2009).
36. Boyarsky, supra note 35.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Van Gelder, supra note 25, at 7.
40. Solutions, Presumed Consent Foundation (last visited Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.presumedconsent.org/solutions.htm; Organ Donation and Transplantation:
Policy Options at EU Level, European Commission (June 27, 2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph-threats/human-substance/oc-organs/consultation-paper.pdf.
The European Commission report uses the 2005 annual statistics from IRODaT.
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donation rates, the effect is not significant.41 Researchers conducted
interviews with leading European transplant experts concluding there
is too much heterogeneity across the presumed and informed consent
organ donation models, and that the differences in donor rates are
attributable to country-specific factors. 42
Conversely, other organ donation experts and economists believe
that a presumed consent model will lead to a statistically significant
increase in donation rates, or at least establish a framework where
donation rates can increase faster.43 A 2006 econometric study found
that when controlling for outside factors, presumed consent can
increase organ donation rates as much as twenty-five percent to thirty
percent.' Similarly, the Centre for Reviews and Dissemination at the
University of York determined that countries with presumed consent
models have higher donation rates, although the increased rates were
not solely attributable to the presumed consent system.45
While the debate continues about the potential benefits and
harms of presumed consent organ donation-from both practical and
psychological standpoints-the larger question is whether this model
could legally be implemented in the United States at a national level.
C. Limited current use of presumed consent laws in the United States
Although informed consent is the traditional organ donation
model in the United States, numerous states have implemented
presumed consent laws on a limited basis.46 As of 1995, twenty-one
states had some form of presumed consent law for posthumous
donation of corneas.47 The extent of presumed consent laws in the
United States is severely restricted, however, and is traditionally
limited to corneas or John Doe homicide victims.48 Since their
41. Boyarsky, supra note 35.
42. Id.
43. Alberto Abadie and Sebastien Gey, The Impact of Presumed Consent Legislation
on Cadaveric Organ Donation: A Cross Country Study, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 599 (2006);
Rithalia, supra note 35.
44. Abadie, supra note 43, at 619.
45. Rithalia, supra note 35, at 35.
46. See Fla. Stat. Ann. §765.5185. See also Mich. C.L.A. 333.10203; but see Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. §521.405(b) (repealed Sept. 2005).




inception, these laws have come under scrutiny, but courts have rarely
found them to violate either state or federal law."
Traditional challenges to presumed consent laws are based in
property and personal rights." In Michigan, a mother challenged the
state's presumed consent law for cornea extraction, complaining that
the act of removing her deceased daughter's corneas constituted an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy." The Michigan Court of
Appeals upheld the law, stating that the right of privacy is entirely
personal and "ends with the death of the person to whom it is of
value. It may not be claimed by his estate or his next of kin."52
Although the court recognized an interference tort cause of action for
family members entitled to possession of a decedent without
mutilation for burial purposes, the court held that cornea removal
without facial appearance alteration was insufficient evidence to
support an individual claim."
Other courts outside of Michigan have come to similar results
regarding the property rights of next of kin and their decedents in
presumed consent situations.4 The Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Roe v. Wade that a person's property rights over their own body
end at death has become the cornerstone of presumed consent
jurisprudence and has made it significantly harder for next of kin to
claim ownership over a decedent." The NCCUSL also recognized the
desire of legislatures to impose limited presumed consent models and
explicitly included such provisions in its 1987 and 2006 versions of
UAGA.
49. See infra notes 51, 54.
50. Fitzgibbons, supra note 13, at 99.
51. Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275,277 (1984).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 277-78.
54. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190-91 (1986) (Supreme Court of Florida
holding that Florida's presumed consent cornea donation law has a permissible legislative
objective of providing sight and that next-of-kin have no fundamental property right in a
decedent); see Lawyer v. Kernodle, 721 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1983) (noting that next-of-
kin only have a quasi-property right in a decedent for the sole purpose of burial (citing
Rosenblum v. New Mt. Sinai Cemetery Ass'n, 481 S.W.2d 593, 594-95 (Mo. App. 1972))).
55. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,152 (1973).
56. Revised Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 22, 8A U.L.A. 70 (2006); Unif. Anatomical
Gift Act § 4, 8A U.L.A. 70 (1987).
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Recently, presumed consent laws have come under scrutiny for
violating the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause." Critics
theorize that because courts recognize a quasi-property right for next
of kin with regard to burial rights, presumed consent infringes upon
what is traditionally a religious service." A further proposed
challenge to presumed consent laws stems from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' It is hypothesized that the
recognition of a quasi-property right for burial satisfies both the
property and liberty interest components of the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protection.' If true, the crucial issue
becomes whether or not the simple act of taking an organ without the
consent of next-of-kin violates that kin's procedural due process."
Despite these proposed challenges, presumed consent laws in the
United States have almost unanimously been found constitutional.
Although these laws have been found constitutional in their limited
nature, it has been suggested that Americans generally-and some
doctors-will not accept a broader version of presumed consent.62
Personal autonomy has long been a hallmark of American society and
the notion of an opt-out model for organ donation appears morally
repugnant to many.
If presumed consent is not an option for psychological,
constitutional, or practical reasons, unconventional models of organ
donation may prove successful in increasing donation rates while also
alleviating concerns of personal autonomy.
57. See generally Carrie Parsons O'Keeffe, When An Anatomical "Gift" Isn't A Gift:
Presumed Consent Laws As An Affront To Religious Liberty, 7 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R.
287 (2002).
58. Id. at n.84.
59. Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent to Organ
Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. SC. &
TECH. 349, 364 (1999).
60. Id.
61. See Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 481-82 (1991); but see Tillman, 360
N.W.2d at 278 (holding that the taking of a person's body parts for a criminal investigation
without the consent of next of kin is constitutional).
62. See Robert M. Veatch & Jonathan B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent:
Ethical Problems in New Organ Procurement Strategies, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC.
1888 (1995); see also Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The
Virtues of a Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV 1, 19 (1989) (noting most doctors find
it unethical to take organs without the consent of the decedent or next of kin).
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III. Coercing the Opt-in Process: Mandated Choice
A. Background
In 2006, Illinois enacted the First-Person Consent Act ("FPCA")
requiring all citizens over age eighteen to inform the state, when
acquiring or renewing their driver's licenses, whether they consent to
being an organ donor after death.3 The FPCA further dictates that
this decision is legally binding and cannot be changed by family
members or witnesses upon death of the intended donor." Along
with convincing passage from the Illinois legislature, the American
Medical Association ("AMA") advocated for the ratification of the
FPCA, one of the first bills of its kind in the United States.5 The
AMA stressed, however, that the mandated choice model is only
appropriate if there is a "meaningful exchange of information" at the
time the choice is made thereby ensuring the system is in accordance
with the principles of informed consent."
B. Prior Attempts at Mandated Choice
Illinois' implementation of the FPCA is not the first iteration of a
mandated choice bill in United States history. Two other states in the
last twenty years have had laws on the books attempting to establish a
mandated choice system with the goal of increasing donation rates.67
In 1991, Texas enacted a statute requiring citizens applying for,
or renewing, driver's licenses to indicate either "yes" or "no" as to
whether they would enter the state's organ donation registryi8 The
law specifically stated that, "[a] statement of gift must be executed
each time a driver's license or personal identification card is renewed,
reinstated, or replaced."" Despite the text of the statute employing
the word "must," individuals were not denied licenses if they failed to
63. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6117 (2006) (amended 2009).
64. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/520 (2006) (amended 2007).
65. Opinion 2.155 - Presumed Consent and Mandated Choice for Organs from




67. 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1204-05; Board on Health Sciences Policy, Organ
Donation: Opportunities for Action 178 (James F. Childress & Catherine T. Liverman
eds.,2006).
68. Board on Health Sciences Policy, supra note 67.
69. Haley Cotter, Increasing Consent for Organ Donation: Mandated Choice,
Individual Autonomy, and Informed Consent, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 599,618 (2011).
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answer the question.0 Furthermore, a refusal to answer the question
or a failure on the part of registry employees to ask the question
yielded an automatic "no" to organ donation." This law was
eventually repealed in 1997 based on the legislature's concerns
surrounding a general lack of public education on organ donation.n
Two years prior to the implementation of the Texas program,
Virginia instituted its own form of limited mandated choice." Unlike
the Texas form that required a firm "yes" or "no" response, the
Virginia form allowed for "yes," "no," or "undecided."" The ability
to choose "undecided" or simply abstain from answering the question
altogether makes this version of mandated choice a partial system.
Although donors were given the option to opt in or not, the organ
donor registry was not established in Virginia until 2000." However,
in a similar fashion to Texas, all non-"yes" responses were registered
as "no" due to the fact that Virginia initially used computers
operating on a binary system" Today, Virginians may still register to
donate their organs when renewing or applying for a driver's license,
but a web-based opt-in registry and changes to the binary computer
system have alleviated many of the former issues and taken the
system out of the realm of mandated choice.
C. The First Amendment and the Right To Not Speak
Assuming the federal government amended its organ donation
policy and enacted a national statute following the mandated choice
model currently employed in Illinois, the issue immediately raised is
whether the law implicates First Amendment protections.
Specifically, the constitutional question presented is whether a
mandated choice model violates a person's right to remain silent on
any particular issue.
In 1943, the Supreme Court recognized that the First
Amendment right of freedom of speech implicates both the right to
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Susan Herz, Two Steps to Three Choices: A New Approach to Mandated Choice, 8
CAMBRIDGE QUARTERLY OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 340 (1999).
73. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-342 (West 1989).
74. Ann C. Klassen & David K. Klassen, Who Are the Donors in Organ Donation?
The Family's Perspective in Mandated Choice, 125 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 70, 72
(1996).
75. Va. Code Ann. § 32.1-292.2 (West 2000).
76. Board on Health Sciences Policy, supra note 67.
77. Id.
403
speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." The only
limitation placed on this rule was that a person could not claim the
protection if essential operations of government to maintain an
orderly society required an individual to speak even if they otherwise
would refrain from doing so." In West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held that students could
not be forced to salute the American flag or recite the Pledge of
Allegiance in school.o A decision upholding the requirement would
be inherently antithetical to the spirit of the First Amendment by
allowing officials to set a standard on a matter of personal opinion.
This holding was later reaffirmed in the Court's decision granting
relief to a Jehovah's Witness seeking to declare unconstitutional a
New Hampshire statute mandating that the state's motto, "Live Free
or Die," be written on every issued license plate.82 The petitioners in
Wooley v. Maynard claimed that the motto conflicted with their
religious and moral beliefs and therefore infringed their First
Amendment rights. In particular, the Court clarified the language of
Barnette by holding that "[a] system which secures the right to
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts."
D. What Right Does Compelling an Answer Abridge?
What is particularly intriguing about the possibility of a First
Amendment challenge to mandated choice based on the right to not
speak is that it is somewhat unclear as to the type of speech right
upon which the government is actually infringing. Although
mandated choice questions compel some sort of speech act, such an
act does not easily fall into one of the traditional categories of speech
enumerated by the Court."
78. West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943)
(Murphy, J. concurring).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 642 (majority opinion).
81. Id.
82. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1977).
83. Id. at 714.
84. False statements of fact (see, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974); see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); threats (see, e.g.,
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)); obscenity (see, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973)); and fighting words (see, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942);
see alo, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
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More importantly, unlike the cases of Barnette and Wooley, the
state in adopting a mandated choice model is not belligerently
attempting to impart a particular viewpoint upon an individual. In
Barnette the issue was that saluting the flag was a deliberate attempt
to instill a sense of nationalistic pride, while in Wooley, New
Hampshire was imparting its state credo on every moving vehicle
registered in the state. Here, the state in its attempt to increase organ
donation rates is only requiring people to express their own views on
the subject, and is not endorsing one particular answer over another.
Contrary to the notion that the state is merely acting as a neutral
party in a mandated choice system, it has been argued that simply
requiring an answer to the question can serve as tacit coercion.
While mandated choice certainly respects individual autonomy more
than a system of presumed consent-by allowing a party to opt in to
the organ donation database rather than force that party to opt out-
"there is a bit of high-handedness in ordering people to record
publicly their choice for or against organ donation."86
With these competing beliefs on the role of the state, the next
crucial question to be asked is, ironically, "how is the question
asked?"
E. The Form of the Question Matters
Looking at the language the Court has used in its prior precedent
on compelling speech acts, it is likely that the constitutionality of any
mandated choice law enacted at the federal or state level will be
largely determined by the language of the question used to compel
the choice. The systems employed by Illinois, Texas, Virginia, and
most recently California in 2010, offer a broad sampling of the
possible ways to ask citizens to become donors and how those
responses are subsequently reported in the states' donor registries.
As previously described in Section 111(b), the systems of Texas
and Virginia asked the question in two different forms, with Virginia
specifically allowing for a third option of "undecided," to potential
registrants." The Illinois model, in turn, more closely mimics the
older system Texas employed in the 1990s by requiring citizens to
85. Amitai Etzioni, Organ Donation: A Communitarian Approach, 13 KENNEDY
INST. OF ETHICS 1, 3 (2003).
86. Id.
87. Supra Part II.b.
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answer either "yes" or "no."" Unlike the Virginia and Texas systems,
the Illinois version of mandated choice does not place those who
answer "no" into a separate non-donor database. Illinois thus leaves
open the door for a next of kin to be asked upon a person's death if
they would like to make a donative gift." Furthermore, the Illinois
system has the added legal bonus that all registrants who answer
"yes" are immediately entered into the database and that decision
becomes permanently binding so that family members may not alter
that choice at the time of death."
In October 2010, California passed its own form of mandated
choice that is similar in nearly every respect to the FPCA.9' The
language of the bill requires that "an application for an original or
renewal driver's license or identification card shall ... include check
boxes for an applicant to mark either (A) Yes, add my name to the
donor registry or (B) I do not wish to register at this time."'
Additionally, regardless of what a registrant marks on his or her form,
a department of motor vehicles employee is required to vocally ask
the registrant if they wish to join the registry." Like Illinois, a
response of "no" will not automatically put donors on a non-donor
registry, and a registrant's "yes" response is made legally binding
regardless of the desires of family members.94
As Amitai Etzioni remarks, the simple asking of a question
regarding donative intent can be perceived as governmental
browbeating in an attempt to coerce parties to join the donor
registry." This potential government coercion implicates the same
conflict in Barnette and Wooley wherein the government attempts to
assert its particular viewpoint-here, that one should donate their
organs-over others in what is a deeply personal and private decision.
Following the Court's opinion in Wooley, if the government attempts
to impart its views upon its citizens, those same citizens must have the
ability to reject those beliefs.' More importantly, however, if a
88. How Required Choice for Organ Donation Actually Works in Practice, Nudge
(Oct. 10, 2010), http://nudges.org/2010/10/10/how-required-choice-for-organ-donation-
actually-works-in-practice.
89. Id.
90. Richard Thaler, Opting in vs. Opting out, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,2009, at BU6.
91. Cal. Veb. Code § 12811(b) (West 2011).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.; Nudge, supra note 88.
95. Etzioni, supra note 85.
96. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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citizen declines to join the registry or is unsure of his or her beliefs on'
becoming an organ donor, the state's categorization of that response
could violate the principle in Barnette that a person has the right to
remain silent.
If the mandated choice system adopted by a state or the federal
government is similar to that of Texas or Virginia, where individuals
are placed on either a donor or non-donor list, the state effectively
coerces an answer to a question on which a person may wish to
remain silent. Such a designation is problematic unless being placed
on a non-donor list puts an individual in the position of a standard
citizen in a generic opt-in system at the time of his or her death.
Unlike Texas and Virginia, the Illinois and California models avoid
this potential pitfall altogether -because there is no non-donor list,
only a donor registry. In those states, because the content of the
speech act recorded is unclear-declining to join the registry could be
either a "no" or an "unsure"-it is likely that the government's
intentional avoidance of coercing a definitive answer avoids
entangling the principle outlined in Barnette.
Still, the courts could find that the mandated choice question
implicates First Amendment protections. Therefore, a discussion of
state interests is necessary."
F. Does the Mandated Choice System Work?
The entire purpose of moving to a mandated choice model for
organ donation is to increase the donation rate of citizens.
Importantly, the mandated choice system retains the principle of
opting in to the registry, while also bringing to the attention of nearly
every citizen, before the time of death, that the ability to donate one's
organs exists. As previously examined, the ability to make decisions
about one's own body is crucial to the constitutionality of any organ
donation system in the United States." Furthermore, a public opinion
survey in 1992 indicated that ninety percent of respondents believed
adopting a mandated choice program is an acceptable option.9
Despite the seemingly overwhelming approval for such a model,
empirical results have been inconclusive.
In the six years that Texas had its mandated choice program in
place, the program generated a distinctly negative reaction from the
97. See infra Part III.g.
98. See supra Part .
99. Aaron Spital, Mandated Choice: The Preferred Solution to the Organ Shortage?,
152 ARCH. INTERNAL MED. 2421 (1992).
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public. After the statute's enactment, the percentage of citizens
declining to register to be organ donors rose to eighty percent.'" In
Virginia, a similar result occurred after the state began asking the
organ donation question when residents registered for driver's
licenses. Although the actual rate of donors in Virginia was higher
than in Texas at thirty-one percent, forty-five percent specifically
registered as non-donors and twenty-four percent were undecided.'o
The results in Illinois, however, indicate that a partial mandated
choice might indeed be the most successful system for registering
more organ donors. Since its adoption in 2006, Donate Life Illinois
reports that sixty percent of adults in the state are now registered as
organ and tissue donors, while eighty-seven percent of adults agree
that registering as an organ donor is "the right thing to do."o2
Compared to the national average of forty-percent registration,
Illinois' partial mandated choice system has significantly outpaced
organ donor rates in other states. Furthermore, while Illinois has
experienced growth in terms of its absolute number and percentage of
donors, the national donor rate has remained relatively stagnant
between 2004 and 2010-increasing alongside, but not in proportion
to-the country's enlarged population."
When comparing the results of Texas and Virginia to Illinois, it is
unclear what has caused the increase in Illinois's donor rate. Factors
such as state culture and increased public education may be
determinative, but there is no actual data to support this conclusion.
Additionally, since California's new partial mandated choice model is
too new, there are no figures to allow conclusions about its
effectiveness. Future studies on donor rates in the state should be
conducted to determine whether mandated choice has a positive
impact on donor rates, or if Illinois is merely a statistical outlier.
100. Laura A. Siminoff & Mary Beth Mercer, Public Policy, Public Opinion, and
Consent for Organ Donation, 10 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 377, 380 (2001).
101. Steve Libowitz, Rethinking Mandated Choice, JOHNS HOPKINS GAZETTE, July 8,
1996.
102. Organ Donation Information - Stats and Facts, Donate Life Illinois,
http://www.donatelifeillinois.org/donatelife/get-the-facts.htm (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
103. Michael Hentrich, Health Matters: Human Organ Donation, Sales, and the Black
Market (Mar. 21, 2012), (unpublished paper, on file with the Cornell University arXiv)
http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1203/1203. 4 289.pdf.
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G. Increasing Donation Rates as a Compelling or Substantial State
Interest
Statutes that implicate First Amendment protections are not
automatically deemed unconstitutional. Depending on the level of
scrutiny used by the court, if the state can provide a compelling or
substantial reason why First Amendment protections should be
rendered secondary to that particular interest, the law may stand.'o4
Mandated choice laws are not likely to trigger strict scrutiny
analysis from the courts because compelling a party to answer a
question about future organ donor plans can be viewed as content
neutral, not content-based."o5 The assertion that mandated choice
models are content neutral, however, is not a full proof argument.
Since the purpose of asking the question is to register more donors,
and one can only do that by targeting current non-donors, it is
plausible to contend that the regulation is based on "the specific
motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.""
As such, these regulations could be deemed to be content-based
restrictions.
Only fifteen years after Wooley, the Court recognized in Burson
v. Freeman, that a statute prohibiting the display of campaign
materials within one hundred feet of a polling place was
constitutional, even though it was a facially content-based restriction
on speech, limiting only certain kinds of political speech.W To save
the statute from being declared unconstitutional, Tennessee showed
that the regulation was necessary to serve the compelling state
interests of protecting voters from intimidation and election fraud
and that it was narrowly tailored to achieve those particular goals.'8
This case represents one of the few situations in which the Court has
allowed such a speech restriction to withstand the strict scrutiny
test."o
In Wooley, however, New Hampshire's two purported state
interests of easily identifying vehicles and promoting state history,
104. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 706, 716 (1977); see United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (for restrictions that are content neutral, the government interest
stated must only be substantial and unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
105. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382.
106. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,829 (1995).
107. 504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992).
108. Id. at 198.
109. Id. at 211 ("simple common sense show[s] that some restricted zone around
polling places is necessary").
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individualism, and state pride were inadequate to meet even the
lower substantial interest bar."o As to the first stated interest of
identifying vehicles, the Court reasoned there were ways to
accomplish the same goal through narrower means than requiring the
placement of the motto on the plates."' The second asserted interest
of promoting state pride was not ideologically neutral, and therefore
any restriction on speech attempting to promote that viewpoint was
invalid."2
Since it is unclear what test the government's stated interest in
increasing organ donation rates must pass-either a compelling or a
substantial interest test-a discussion of both is required. Should the
courts determine a mandated choice law is a content-based
restriction, it is probable that acquiring more organ donors does not
qualify as a compelling state interest, nor that the government's
intended means are narrowly tailored to that end. Compelling
interests in the past have included national security,"' preserving
human life, and protecting the mentally ill from medical malpractice
or coercion."4 The Supreme Court has further limited the notion of
what constitutes an interest in preserving human life, despite its use of
broad facial language. In Washington v. Glucksberg, a Washington-
state ban on assisted suicides was deemed constitutional because it
helped preserve human life, rather than end it voluntarily."' In the
case of mandated choice, there is no imminent threat of another party
affirmatively taking the life of a transplant waitlist patient. Without
this qualifying factor, the government's intention to generally
preserve human life appears to fail the Glucksberg standard.16 Even
if the courts recognize increasing organ donor rates as a compelling
interest, the availability of less intrusive models such as the standard
opt-in system likely dooms the law's fate.
In the far more likely case that the Court recognizes mandated
choice laws as content-neutral, however, the state's asserted interest
of compelling organ donor registration becomes increasingly
110. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716-17 (1977); see also, supra, notes 82-84.
111. Id. at 716.
112. Id. at 717.
113. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981); but compare Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116
(1958).
114. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,703 (1997).
115. Id. at 735.
116. Id. at 732.
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palatable. Interests such as protecting societal order and morality,"7
protecting citizens from unwanted noise,"8 promoting the tranquility
of the home,"' and maintaining parks in an attractive and intact
condition'20 have all been deemed substantial governmental interests.
Given the life-and-death nature of organ donation and government's
general concern for the wellbeing of its citizens, the interest of
compelling organ donor registration to save lives appears to easily
qualify under the Court's prior precedent.
The easiest way to ensure First Amendment protections are not
placed in jeopardy is for legislatures to craft intelligent mandated
choice statutes. Even in the case that a legislature fails to heed the
warning, however, the law will likely survive a constitutional
challenge.
IV. Incentivizing the Gift of Life: Preferred Donation
A. Background
In 2008, Israel recognized it had a severe organ transplant
problem and one of the lowest organ donation rates in the developed
world. 121 As a result, a radical new policy was developed to increase
the donation rate based on the policy of reciprocal altruism. 2  Upon
the advice of concerned doctors, the Knesset passed a law that utilizes
a non-medical factor in determining which patients should receive an
organ off the transplant waiting list." Specifically, the nonmedical
criterion used is that if an eligible adult signs up to be an organ donor
prior to the time when he or she needs an organ, that individual is
given priority status over another adult in need of the same organ
who had not previously signed up to be a donor.124
117. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,567 (1991).
118. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
119. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988).
120. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1989).
121. Jacob Lavee et al., A New Law for Allocation of Donor Organs in Israel, The
Lancet (Dec. 17, 2009) http://www.hods.org/pdf/Lancet%20-%2ODecember%2017,
%202009.pdf. In January 2008, only forty-five percent of eligible brain-dead patients in
Israel had either previously given, or had their next-of-kin give, consent to donate their




124. Organ Implementation Law, 5768-2008, SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.).
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Further complicating the process is the intricate point system
based on the particular organ at stake, a candidate's medical
condition, and whether or not family members are also involved in
the donor program. For example, a kidney transplant waitlistee can
have a score range of zero to eighteen points, with candidates who
signed up as donors receiving two points.125 If a candidate's first-
degree relative has signed an organ donor card, but the candidate has
not, an allocation of one point is given.126 If, however, the candidate's
first-degree relative has donated an organ after death or the
candidate or first-degree relative was a live nondesignated donor, the
candidate receives three and a half points.m Similar points-based
systems exist for lung, heart, and liver candidates. 2 8
Israel believes this system not only ensures patients with serious
medical conditions are granted priority over others in the organ
donation waitlist, but that the program also avoids an uncomfortable
paradox. Dr. Jacob Levee first developed the program after having
patients confide in him that they would never be willing to donate an
organ, but would gladly accept one." That people would actively
accept such a gift, yet were in turn unwilling to sacrifice a piece of
themselves, caused Dr. Levee to design a system that guarantees that
those willing to donate receive priority. Those who sign up for the
program prior to April 2012 will be granted immediate access to the
priority program, whereas those who sign up after that time will have
to wait for three years to gain priority eligibility.130
B. Does It Work?
Early indications are that the new Israeli organ donation
program is a successful way to achieve a higher rate of donations.
After the law's passage in 2008, a large publicity campaign touting the
benefits of the new program and organ donation in general was
launched utilizing radio, television, billboards, and newspapers."'
Prior to passage of the new law and its advertising campaign, Israel




129. Danielle Ofri, In Israel, a New Approach to Organ Donation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16, 2012) http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/in-israel-a-new-approach-to-organ-
donation.
130. Dan Even, Dramatic Increase in Organ Transplants Recorded in Israel in 2011,
Haaretz, Jan. 12, 2012.
131. Ofri, supra note 129.
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saw around 3,000 new donor registrants per month.32 During the ten
weeks of the promotion program, the department responsible for
issuing new donation cards saw a substantial increase of seventy
thousand new registrants, raising the total number of Israelis
registered to over 632,000."31
While the priority program has certainly played a part in
increasing the number of willing organ donors, Israel has taken other
dramatic steps that might have a much larger impact on donations.
Part of the law passed in 2008 also provides for a form of financial
compensation for live donors.' Exclusively for live organ donors, the
Israeli government will provide forty days of lost wages and up to
30,000 shekels for proven medical expenses for five years after the
donation."'s On January 19, 2010, Israel passed a further modification
to its Public Health Law, whereby anyone making a gift in accordance
with the Organ Implementation Law would also be exempted from
paying insurance premiums for a temporary period as determined by
the Minister of the Health in consultation with the Minister of the
Treasury."' Lastly, in 2011, Israel adopted the "chain of living
donors" program, which makes it legal for relatives of kidney
waitlistees to donate an organ to another waitlistee in exchange for a
kidney for their own sick relative.'37
With these supplementary programs, 2011 saw the single largest
increase in organ donations in Israel's history. A total of 348
transplants were conducted over the course of the year, a sixty-eight
percent increase over the total from 2010." Kidney, liver, and heart
transplants saw increases of over one hundred percent in the number
of total transplants.'"
C. An Equal Protection Problem for Preferred Donation Laws
Despite these laws appearing to have a profound effect on organ
donation rates in Israel, enacting similar systems in the United States
could run afoul of the Constitution. The most obvious issue that
appears is a possible equal protection violation when the government
132. Id.
133. Id.; Even, supra note 130.
134. Even, supra note 130.
135. Id.
136. Public Health (Amendment No. 47) Law, 5770-2010 (Isr.).
137. Id.
138. Even, supra note 130.
139. Id.
413
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
provides an organ to one individual over another based on non-
medical factors.
The primary rule stemming from the Equal Protection Clause is
that "[s]tates must treat like cases alike but may treat unlike cases
accordingly."'" As long as a legislative classification or distinction
does not burden a fundamental right nor target a suspect class, a
strong presumption of legality exists and the law will stand so long as
it is rationally related to some legitimate state interest.41
The definition of a suspect class was articulated in footnote four
of United States v. Carolene Products Co. There, Justice Stone
declared that certain groups are "discrete and insular minorities" and
that laws discriminating against such groups "may call for a more
searching judicial inquiry."1 42  Using this standard, the Court has
recognized multiple legislative classifications that meet the definition
of a suspect class, including race,'143 religion,'" national origin ,'14 and in
certain cases, alienage.'" Legislation that discriminates against such
classes must be narrowly tailored and must further a compelling
government interest in order to survive strict scrutiny analysis.'
In addition to suspect classes, the Court has recognized two types
of quasi-suspect classes-gender and illegitimacy-that only need to
pass intermediate scrutiny." Unlike strict scrutiny, intermediate
scrutiny requires that if a legislative classification on its face
discriminates against either of those two groups, the legislation must
be substantially related to an important governmental interest.' 49 All
other facial classifications in legislation need only pass rational basis
review, meaning the law need only be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest."o
140. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216
(1982).
141. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,631 (1996).
142. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 at n.4 (1938).
143. Adarand Constructors v. Perla, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas,
347 U.S. 475 (1954); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
144. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
145. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
146. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
147. Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. at 227.
148. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976); see also
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-24 (1982).
149. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
150. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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D. Does Donative Intent Make Patients Not Similarly Situated?
Under any claim of an equal protection violation, the courts first
must consider whether or not the groups being compared are
similarly situated. If the groups are not similarly situated, the
government has the ability to apply different standards to them so
long as those standards are not discriminatory.
The specific question of whether individual intent is sufficient to
distinguish between two otherwise equal persons has not yet been
decided by the Supreme Court. Recently, however, the Court
articulated that terminally ill patients requesting assistance to commit
suicide are distinguishable from patients refusing life-saving
treatment."' Vacco v. Quill dealt with a New York statute that
prohibited doctors from actively assisting terminally ill patients to kill
themselves, yet permitted doctors to respect the decision of patients
to refuse treatment thereby resulting in severe pain and death by
natural causes.'52 The Court reasoned the law did not discriminate
against any particular group because it applied to every patient
equally and that New York could properly distinguish between the
types of patients because they are not similarly situated, as indicated
through former Court precedent and the opinions of numerous
medical organizations.'53
In the case of incentivized donation, however, the situation is not
nearly as clear-cut. The notion of providing a benefit to patients on a
transplant list simply because at one point the patient signaled an
intent to donate could lead the Court down a slippery slope, requiring
it to make determinations about the intent of the parties in a host of
other scenarios and whether such intent makes a particular group
distinguishable. One argument that can be extracted from Vacco in
favor of such a distinction between groups is that the Court actively
recognized the fact that a patient's wishes make a difference in how
society should treat them. The simple counter to this line of
reasoning, though, is that the Court had already accepted preventing
suicide in any form as a legitimate state interest, so a person therefore
cannot wish to commit such an act no matter how merciful it may
be.154 Therefore, a more compelling explanation of the principle
guiding the Court in Vacco is not recognition of differentiating
151. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 800 (1997).
152. Id. at 797.
153. Id. at 800-01.
154. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,730 (1997).
415
between a patient's wishes, but instead abiding by the overarching
public policy of preventing suicides.
Further complicating the question is that under Israel's version
of the law, a person can extract a benefit from the state without
having signaled any intent to donate. The Organ Implementation
Law grants a partial benefit to patients who are first-degree relatives
of persons who have signed up for the program."' If adopted in the
United States, this provides a far more hazardous case for the courts
because, even if they can find a distinction between patients who
intend to donate and those who do not, certifying the granting of a
benefit to someone simply on the basis of whom they are related to
appears murky at best. Without any evidence of intent to donate, two
patients in the same medical condition on a transplant waitlist appear,
in all meanings of the term, similarly situated.
E. Incentivizing Donation Is Not Facially Discriminatory
In the unlikely case where the courts determine that the donative
intent of patients is sufficient to categorize them as dissimilar, the
next step under an equal protection analysis is to determine if the
statute is actually discriminatory. In Israel's Organ Implementation
Law, there is nothing that suggests a legislative attempt to treat
classes of persons differently. Everyone in Israel is allowed to join
the program, give consent at the time of death to be an organ donor,
and receive the benefits of the incentive system without other
qualification.'
Since the law does not appear on its face to create any
classification, if it were enacted in the United States it would be
presumed constitutional under an equal protection challenge so long
as it is rationally related to some government interest. On this point,
it is clear the law is related to the interest of acquiring more organs to
preserve the lives of waitlisted patients. This concern qualifies as a
legitimate state interest in light of the Court's previous recognition
that preserving life, preventing suicide, preventing harm to third
parties, and protecting medical ethics are all legitimate state
interests."'
155. Organ Implementation Law, 5768-2008, SH No. 2144 p. 394 (Isr.).
156. Id.
157. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The State's Interest in the Preservation of Life: From Quinlan
to Cruzan, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 891, 891 at n.3 (1989).
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F. Incentivizing Donation May Have a Discriminatory Impact
Although the Organ Implementation Law is not facially
discriminatory, there is the possibility that, if enacted in the United
States, it could still come under challenge for discriminating against
certain religions. Currently, the United States employs a transplant
waitlist system that only considers the medical criteria of the
waitlistees.18 When only medical criteria are considered, the theory is
that every patient-regardless of status, wealth, religion, or race-is
equally eligible to get an organ. Should the federal government adopt
a measure similar to Israel's, it would be incorporating new non-
medical criteria that could disadvantage certain persons who believe
it is appropriate to accept an organ transplant, yet believe donating
their organs to another violates their religious principles.
Unlike facial equal protection challenges, discrimination
challenges concerning facially neutral laws require courts to clear
additional hurdles to declare the acts unconstitutional. For any non-
facial discriminatory challenge to be considered by the courts, there
must first be a disproportionate impact on a suspect or quasi-suspect
class."9 If a disproportionate impact can be shown, the party alleging
the violation must also prove the legislature had a discriminatory
intent in passing the law.' In determining whether or not a
discriminatory intent exists, however, the disproportionate impact
carries only evidentiary value and is not conclusive."'
Even when a facially neutral law has a clearly disproportionate
impact on a quasi-suspect class that is known to legislators, the
Supreme Court has upheld such a law under siege from an equal
protection challenge so long as no discriminatory intent could be
found.62 In Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney,
Massachusetts passed a statute that required all veterans who
qualified for civil service positions to be considered before any
qualifying nonveterans.'63 Since an overwhelming number of veterans
are males, the law was challenged on the notion that it inherently
158. Understanding the Organ Transplant Waiting List, Gift of Life Donor Program,
http://www.donorsl.org/patients/waitinglist/#1 (last visited Mar. 28, 2012).
159. See Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); see
also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
160. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265.
161. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 ("Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory purpose may
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is true, that
the law bears more heavily on one race than another.").
162. Personnel Adm'r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
163. Id. at 259.
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preferred men for civil service jobs and denied otherwise qualified
women an opportunity to obtain these positions.'" The Court held
that despite the vast evidence showing a disparate impact on women
in acquiring civil service jobs as a result of the law, a discriminatory
intent is only found when it is a factor that influenced the legislative
choice.' Here, the Court found a legitimate state interest in wanting
to favor veterans, not men, in gender-neutral terms and therefore the
law was deemed nondiscriminatory under rational basis review."
The real impact of the Court's opinion in Feeney was that even
showing legislative volition and awareness of the consequences of
passing such a statute is insufficient to prove discriminatory intent.1
This has made success much more difficult for plaintiffs in equal
protection cases, as legislators are generally intelligent enough to
avoid using words in a statute or in the law's legislative history that
tip courts off to an underlying nefarious intent." If proof of
discriminatory intent and disparate impact is found, however, an
analysis under strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny is required,
subject to the particular class being discriminated against.'
The Equal Protection claim that might be asserted against the
passage of an Israeli-style Organ Implementation Law in the United
States would closely parallel the facts of Feeney. For persons whose
religious beliefs bar the donation of organs yet allow them to accept
such donative gifts, the law has a clearly disparate impact on their
ability to move up the transplant waiting list. The harder barrier to
clear is proof of a discriminatory intent. As Feeney makes clear,
intent is not proven just by showing the consequences of the law were
known to legislators; intent is only proven when such consequences
are a reason for passing the law. While the facts surrounding the
law's passage will be crucial to determining intent, it is highly
doubtful that a legislature will pass a version of the preferred
164. Id.
165. Id. at 277.
166. Id. at 275 ("Just as there are cases in which impact alone can unmask an invidious
classification... there are others, in which-notwithstanding impact-the legitimate
noninvidious purposes of a law cannot be missed. This is one.").
167. Id. at 279.
168. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REv. 747, 764 (2011).
169. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (claiming the law is purposefully
discriminatory based on gender and, because there is no substantial relationship to a
legitimate government interest, the law violates intermediate scrutiny required for quasi-
suspect classes).
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donation law to discriminate against a particular religion, as the goal
of the policy is to acquire more organs for all citizens.
If evidence of discriminatory intent behind the law were to
surface, it would almost certainly doom the law's constitutionality
because, unlike the class distinction in Feeney, religion is a suspect
class and laws rarely pass muster under strict scrutiny analysis. It is
probable that the Court would accept the government's purpose of
procuring organs as being legitimate and find that the law is
substantially related to that purpose. That the law is narrowly
tailored to serve that purpose would be a much more difficult claim
for the government to make, given the myriad of other organ
procurement policies already enacted across the country.
G. Preferred Donation Laws Create a Perverse Incentive
Dr. Levee, who formed the initial idea of incentivizing donation
by providing registrants preferred status, did so because of the
paradox of patients accepting organs and at the same time refusing to
donate. While the policy has seen positive effects in Israel, it also
creates its own perverse incentive of defrauding the system for
personal gain.
If an individual knows he or she is likely to need an organ in the
future, it is possible to enter the program simply for the benefit of
being given priority status on the waitlist and later, once an organ is
procured and transplanted, drop out of the program entirely. This
fraudulent intent is especially problematic considering the continually
increasing number of patients being placed on transplant waitlists.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the law could prohibit a person from
leaving the program once he or she has received a transplant, as
donating an organ under the program is considered a gift and a
current waitlistee cannot claim reliance on an unknown donor's
property. Before any state legislature passes a preferred donation
law, careful consideration of the perverse incentive of fraud is
required to make sure the harm to society is outweighed by the law's
benefits.
V. Alternate Incentives
Along with the preferred status given to registered organ donors
in Israel, the Organ Implementation Law grants transplant patients
monetary benefits as a result of the surgery.' Given the success of
170. Even, supra note 130.
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the program attributed to these alternate benefits, a brief
examination of the other incentives and how they would be treated in
the United States is necessary.
Congress and the NCCUSL have specifically mandated that it is
unlawful to acquire, receive, or transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration."' Like the Israeli law, valuable consideration does not
consider lost wages and these are fully recoverable. 2 Another aspect
of the Israeli system regarding payments for future care is not clearly
defined as being within the ambit of Congress' prohibition against
compensation. While it is socially responsible to make sure organ
transplant donors are given the care necessary to address any
negative side effects of donation, it is unclear if such compensation
fits within the ban on valuable consideration. Additionally, despite a
current lack of post-transplant financial support for live donors, a
majority of American Society of Transplant Surgeons approve of
providing non-living donors with funeral costs or a charitable
organization donation made in their name.77 The most troubling
incentive in Israel's program, however, is providing a health insurance
premium exemption for donors. In the United States, given that such
a provision is likely not considered in the same breath as a tax
incentive, the health insurance premium incentive would probably be
classified as a separate financial gain that runs counter to the express
intentions of Congress.
Although the idea of financially incentivizing organ donations in
the United States has been floated as a means of increasing donation
rates, it is simply a political non-starter.'74 Nonetheless, private
citizens in the United States have established a similar version of the
"chain of living donors" program utilized in Israel.'7 ' Lifesharers, a
nonprofit voluntary organization, allows its members to designate a
preference in providing fellow members with their organs over non-
members."' The network uses the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network's ("OPTN") waitlist rankings, and if the
171. 42 U.S.C. § 274E (1984); Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §16 (amended 1987).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 274E(c)(2) (1984).
173. Robert Arnold et al., Financial Incentives for Cadaver Organ Donation: An
Ethical Reappraisal, 73 TRANSPLANTATION 1361 (2002).
174. Stephen J. Dubner, Is America Ready for an Organ-Donor Market?,
Freakonomics, http://www.freakonomics.com/2006/05/15/is-america-ready-for-an-organ-
donor-market (last visited May 15, 2006).
175. How Lifesharers Works, Lifesharers, http://www.lifesharers.org/howitworks.aspx
(last visited Mar. 29, 2012).
176. Id.
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donor is a member of Lifesharers, the organ can be assigned first to
the highest-matching Lifesharers member.m' Unlike the Israeli
system that allows for live donor transfers, Lifesharers only takes
donor organs from deceased members of the network."' The
Lifesharers system allows any registered donor to join the program,
and because the system does not provide any form of financial
compensation to members for organ donations, it is perfectly legal in
the United States."
VI. Conclusion
Organ donation is a popular and highly effective medical practice
that saves thousands of lives each year. In spite of its popularity and
an increase in public education on the subject, the number of
individuals throughout the world signing up to give the gift of life still
remains quite low. Increasing the number of organ donors is
becoming a prevalent topic of discussion for legislatures, but there is
no consensus on the best means of achieving this noble goal.
Comparing the primary European alternative of presumed consent,
the mandated choice system, and Israel's Organ Implementation Law,
what is certain is that the form any future law takes has a significant
impact on its constitutionality.
Presumed consent eliminates much of the altruistic nature that
comes when an individual makes a donative gift. With many citizens
today wary of the government compelling actions regarding their
bodies, particularly after death, implementing such a program
nationally would come with heavy public scrutiny. When the
California legislature and former Governor Schwarzenegger enacted
the state's mandated choice law in 2010, they specifically rejected
passing a presumed consent model out of fear it may be
unconstitutional." Despite the overtly compelling nature of the
program and legislative wariness of the system, courts across the
country have held limited versions of the model constitutional. The
very narrow circumstances of current presumed consent systems in








uproar over the Affordable Care Act, an expansion of the model is
unlikely to happen in the near future.
Mandated choice, on the other hand, preserves the altruistic opt-
in nature of organ donation while also requiring the topic be brought
to the attention of individuals. Unlike presumed consent, which takes
control of the decision for persons regarding their bodies after death,
mandated choice merely compels a response about one's future
wishes. By providing an actual choice not to oblige the government's
potentially subtle opinion that donating organs is a social benefit, a
well-crafted version of the law likely survives a First Amendment
challenge. While the system might be a success legally, what is
troubling for mandated choice generally is that it is unclear whether
the model actually raises donation rates-or even worse, lowers them.
Although the concept of incentives to increase donations has
long been discussed, Israel's new program is the first to give citizens a
truly wide variety of offerings in an attempt to raise the country's
precipitously low donor rate. The set of financial incentives being
offered by the Israeli government, beginning with workers'
compensation and medical expenses and ending with health insurance
exemptions, range from the perfectly legal to the potentially
forbidden under United States law. Most intriguing, however, is the
preferred donor program that provides an unguaranteed but
significant benefit to registrants. Although there is a host of
requirements and regulations, the model offers a unique legal
question under the Equal Protection Clause surrounding potential
discrimination based solely on the declared status of individuals.
Declared status, without other action, should not be sufficient to find
that the government created distinct classes, while a challenge based
on religious discrimination should likewise fall because the law would
be neutral on its face and in its statutory history. Furthermore,
enacting a modified version of the incentive system in the United
States could yield strongly positive results, as it has in Israel.
With the recent debate over the constitutionality of the
Affordable Care Act, United States citizens have never been more
attuned to healthcare issues. Organ donation is a problem that
continues to plague society. Given the likely constitutionality of
these new models for donation, legislatures should begin earnestly
discussing these solutions without fear.
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